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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
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English riots and the management of urban decline
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Abstract This article develops a framework for understanding policy-making 
responses to the crisis of the post-industrial urban economy in Britain through an 
exploration of the policy event of the 1981 English riots and the policy-making ield 
that surrounded it in which the rival positions of ‘managed decline’ and concerted 
urban regeneration became reconciled through a roll-out of neoliberal governance 
mechanisms. The value of this framework for contemporary analyses of urban pol-
icy in the context of social marginality and uneven economic development is dis-
cussed in the conclusion.
Keywords Urban unrest · Urban policy · Managed decline · Liverpool · Bourdieu
Alone, every night… I would stand with a glass of wine, looking out at the magnificent view over the 
river, and ask myself what had gone wrong for this great English city. The Mersey, its lifeblood, flowed 
as majestically as ever down from the hills. Its monumental Georgian and Victorian buildings, created 
with such pride, still dominated the skyline. The Liver Building itself, the epicentre of a trading system 
that had reached out to the four corners of the earth, stood defiant and from my perspective very alone … 
everything had gone wrong. 
(Michael Heseltine in Hunt, 2004).
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Introduction
In this article, we examine the urban disorders in England of the early 1980s, 
and in particular those that afected Liverpool, in the context of a contested set 
of responses at a national government level. This contest pitted the Treasury’s 
advocacy of a ‘managed decline’ of the city against an interventionist business-
irst strategy promoted by the Department of Environment under the stewardship 
of Michael Heseltine. Those events resonate with the urban and social conditions 
that underpinned the more recent riots of summer 2011 and a sense that political 
conditions and reactions related to them continue today. Using the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu, we discuss how the ield of urban policy emerged during this earlier 
phase. This was characterised by a terrain that was deined largely by elites in a 
top-down process of political decision-making that heralded the re-centralisation 
of urban politics after the brief sojourn of the municipal left in cities like Liv-
erpool. Among contemporary political debates about devolution, planning local-
ism and austerity the events that unfolded in Liverpool highlight the relevance of 
analyses focusing on the role of political structures and key actors, both of which 
framed and came to shape the policy ield and that of British cities more broadly 
since that time. Our analysis is thus guided by an ongoing concern that central-
ised and bureaucratic disjunctures remain and thus feed the potential for further 
unrest and social anger in the future.
Our analysis is developed through a close reading of Cabinet papers from the 
irst Thatcher government and is supplemented by an analysis of the biographies 
and of interviews with the principal protagonists, along with relevant public and 
independent enquiry reports. Rather than focusing on the experience and testimo-
nies of the afected communities themselves —several studies have covered these 
themes in detail (see Cooper 1985; Frost and Phillips 2011; Belchem and MacRaild 
2006)—we expand on our previous recent work on ‘non state space’ (Atkinson et al. 
2017) in which the state, private service providers and citizens combine to avoid 
or diminish contact or responsibility for neighbourhoods and urban areas seen as 
being unworthy of salvation in part because the residents and/or those who represent 
them are deemed as bearing responsibility for their own deprivation. Work by Wac-
quant (2002, 2018) has also highlighted the production of ‘defamed’ and stigmatised 
neighbourhoods as a particular strategy of a new type of emerging neoliberal gov-
ernance. For Bourdieu and his colleagues (Bourdieu et al. 1999), the state was seen 
to have abdicated responsibility for poverty, despite public proclamations of inclu-
sion and investment. We build on these studies by further evidencing how it is that 
stigmatised and excluded spaces come into being as a process of neglect (benign or 
planned) by central government. We also seek to identify what distinguishes sites 
of social relegation from other urban locales and how strategies of inclusion and 
exclusion are contested and legitimised at diferent levels of government. Thus, the 
primary goal of this article is to remedy what has been a tendency to side-line the 
important role of higher-level policy-making processes and their response to sites 
of urban crisis that assume rival positions within the national policy ield. Bourdieu 
explains the ield of power in the following terms:
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The ield of power is a ield of forces structurally determined by the state of 
the relations of power among forms of power, or diferent forms of capital. It is 
also and inseparably, a ield of power struggles among the holders of diferent 
forms of power, a gaming space in which those agents and institutions possess-
ing enough speciic capital (economic or cultural capital in particular) to be 
able to occupy the dominant positions within their respective ields confront 
each other using strategies aimed at preserving or transforming these relations 
of power (Bourdieu, 1996: 264–3).
If we consider the deeper history of interventions into spatial inequality, it was par-
ticularly the challenges to national prosperity across many European states in the 
late twentieth century that generated policy innovations to tackle uneven economic 
development, poor housing conditions among the working classes, service provi-
sion and to deal also with skills and local economic investment. The rise of a new 
bureaucratic caste of specialist technocrats, which Bourdieu meticulously researches 
in the case of the graduates of the French grandes écoles (Bourdieu 1996), inds its 
equivalent in the UK in the emergence during the post-war period of specialist think 
tanks, governmental advisory bodies, such as the Central Policy Review Staf, and 
senior civil servants who increasingly performed a policy shaping as opposed to a 
policy advisory role.
As a ield of power, urban policy-making emerged as a relatively late, explicit 
formulation of national governance strategies in the United Kingdom, in their most 
conspicuous form from the 1980s onwards, but with some antecedents in local 
economic planning initiatives during the 1970s (Gough and Eisenschitz 1996) and 
the community development programmes of the 1960s. Particular to programmes 
in the UK was a concern with how globally mobile capital investment, trade union 
obstruction and city governments had produced a poverty of urban social conditions 
and the need for the central state to provide extending arrangements and mecha-
nisms by which investment could be directly provided and co-opted from the private 
sector in speciic geographies of decline and economic change (Urban Task Force 
1999; Bennett 2005). Central to this objective was the management of urban popula-
tions. As Mike Raco argues:
[t]he governance of urban populations has … become a signiicant problem for 
government, particularly in a context where divisions between communities 
are growing and earlier modes of citizenship-building, embedded in national 
identities and other social conventions and norms, have been eroded and frag-
mented (Raco 2009, 440).
Our analysis here considers the constitution of what would now be classiied as 
‘urban policy’, a set of statements, actions and frameworks that identify neigh-
bourhoods, cities and other spatial scales to which investment, governance bod-
ies and other arrangements should be devoted. In the case of the UK, as Imrie 
and Thomas argue, the introduction of the Urban Development Corporations 
(UDCs) in 1980 marked something of a watershed as ‘the very raison d’etre of 
local authorities was being questioned’ through the privatisation of public pol-
icy and a signiicant reduction in the regulatory power of the local state whose 
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powers of land-use planning and ownership were superseded by the powers of 
the UDCs (Imrie and Thomas 1999, pp. 4–5). As Meegan (2003) notes, various 
new geographies and powers were designated in Liverpool itself. Here the city 
was a veritable test bed for exercises in the depoliticisation of urban government. 
The city was designated one of the irst Enterprise Zones, established in Speke in 
1981. The Merseyside Task Force was the irst of its kind to be established, while 
Granby and Toxteth (site of the subsequent riots) were the location for some of 
the irst City Action Teams. Finally, the Merseyside Development Corporation, 
one of the earliest UDCs to be established, was formed in the aftermath of the 
1981 disturbances and survived until 1998, while in 1986 the Merseyside County 
Council fell victim to the ‘Streamlining of the Cities’ agenda (along with the 
GLC and a number of other metropolitan authorities) thus removing Merseyside’s 
only regional tier of government (Meegan 2003, pp. 60–61).
Important although these business-oriented changes to urban policy-making 
were, it is important to understand that urban policy also involves contests over 
space and the production of ‘a regime of representation that consolidates a certain 
spatial order’ (Dikeç 2007, p. 5). In other words, urban policy is not only interested 
in making cities work according to a given set of economic, social and political pri-
orities. Such policies also require the establishment of a particular urban order that 
conditions and regulates the dispositions of local actors as well as institutions, in a 
subordinate position to the place of central and executive power. Imrie and Thomas 
see this emerging urban policy order as an approach to ‘inner city decline, as mar-
ket-led strategies to lever in private property investment, with an efective transfer 
of policy-making from public to private sectors’ (Imrie and Thomas 1999, p. 6; 
see also; Edwards and Imrie 2015). But while in hindsight this observation appears 
incontrovertibly true, we also suggest that in the years immediately following the 
1981 riots, a very diferent urban order remained in serious contention at the heart 
of the early Thatcher administration—one calling for ‘urban regeneration’ while 
another fought to favour a regime of ‘managed decline’ of peripheral and insubordi-
nate urban jurisdictions, of which Liverpool was emblematic.
Following Pierre Bourdieu, we see this contested policy space in terms of the 
formation of a newly emergent urban policy ield in which political elites with very 
high levels of economic, symbolic and cultural capital decided the means and terms 
upon which social mitigation should be provided or denied by the state—often with-
out understanding the poverty of conditions in the spaces over which they argued. In 
considering the problems of a post-industrial outpost in the 1980s north of England, 
we inevitably relect on broader processes and diiculties that continue to pervade 
regional and national approaches to policy-making on city economic development 
and renewal today in which allegations of a disconnected metropolitan policy-mak-
ing elite bandying about massive public sector cuts continue to circulate.
In formulating our analytical framework, we support Dubois’ argument that 
Bourdieusian ield theory allows us to see how the policy space is formed and 
thereby ‘to construct policy as a sociological object’ (Dubois 2012, p. 204). Dubois 
elaborates the point by explaining how Bourdieu developed an analysis of the space 
of positions and position-takings in the production of housing policies during the 
presidency of Valerie Giscard-D’Eistaing. As Dubois goes on to claim:
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What the empirical mobilization of this sociology shows in this case is that the 
ield of production of a policy is rarely reducible to the mechanical relection 
of a class relation, and that the dominant groups in established positions have 
not always won (Dubois, 2012: 206).
These ideas are particularly apposite when analysing competing discourses of legiti-
mation operating within a single party of government. In such contexts, ministers 
are often vulnerable to embedded cultures of regulation—in particular the ‘Treasury 
view’—the overturning of which usually requires an exogenous seismic shock such 
as a world war, a severe economic crisis or in the context of this article, the worst 
civil disorders in mainland Britain in the twentieth century.
In the policy event that we investigate here, the competing ield positions were 
represented by that of, irst, the Treasury, which insisted that capital investment 
(including support for enterprise) could only be justiied where a return on public 
money could be guaranteed through economic growth. The second, led by the then 
Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael Heseltine, argued the case for the 
rescue and rehabilitation of a city that his cabinet colleagues seemed more willing 
to condemn to a ‘managed decline’. Heseltine’s epiphany followed a series of regu-
lar visits to Liverpool as ‘Minister for the Mersey’. These visits led him to take an 
opposing ield position to that of the Treasury’s laissez-aller (letting go) strategy and 
to instead advocate a policy of state-led regeneration that had the ultimate aim of 
depoliticising and deterritorialising a blighted urban environment through what was 
to become the irst wave of ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell 2002). ‘Man-
aged decline’ versus ‘urban regeneration’ thus came to deine opposing positions in 
the ield of urban policy-making in the 1980s, but they were articulated in the con-
text of a signiicant diminution in the role of metropolitan government and the priva-
tisation of locally managed public assets such as social housing as well as municipal 
services via compulsory competitive tendering and private–public partnerships.
A city apart?
The port city of Liverpool has long struggled to provide adequate levels of employ-
ment for its working age population due to the precarious nature of its maritime 
industries and the decline of manufacturing in the north-west of England in the lat-
ter half of the twentieth century. The 1901 census records a city with a population 
of around 900,000, but this dramatically declined in size over the following years. 
The Report of the Special Investigators of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law 
(1905–1909) found that, ‘[o]f industrial conditions, the most potent cause of pauper-
ism to be found is casual labour’, and this was particularly associated with the large 
sea-ports such as Liverpool where until 1940 employment was entirely dependent 
on daily hire at the discretion of ‘hatch bosses’ or foremen. Other factors contribut-
ing to pauperism were identiied as bad housing conditions, seasonal luctuations in 
trade, unhealthy trades and insanitary conditions of work, below subsistence wages, 
and the existence of dangerous trades. In the area around Toxteth Park, which the 
Poor Law Commission referred to as ‘South Liverpool’, all these contributing 
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factors could be identiied. There was little in the way of manufacturing industry at 
the turn of the century and a large itinerant workforce relied on the luctuating for-
tunes of a shipping trade that was increasingly losing custom to the southern ports 
(Cooney 1984).
Population loss has proved to be an enduring problem for the city. Over 100,000 
residents left Liverpool during the decade 1971–1981, either as a result of slum 
clearances and the rehousing of the ex-inner-city population to newer social housing 
in the wider city-region, or in search of better economic opportunities elsewhere. 
Today the City of Liverpool houses around 440,000 in a story of population decline 
and suburbanisation that parallels that of Glasgow. The Index of Multiple Depriva-
tion for 2010 shows that fully half of its neighbourhoods were in the most deprived 
areas in England, with the other core cities (Manchester, Newcastle, Leeds, Bir-
mingham, Sheield and Bristol) showing between 45 and 12%, respectively. The 
city thereby remains at the apex of an unenviable league table of ill-health, crime, 
education and economic indicators, much of this being given a particular illip by 
the containerisation of shipping and loss of many dock worker jobs from 1968 
onwards (Wilks-Heeg 2003).
On the eve of the 1981 Toxteth riots, unemployment igures were released that 
showed 81,629 adults without work were chasing just 1019 vacancies in the City of 
Liverpool. There were only a few dozen openings for the thousands of school leav-
ers who had joined the ranks of the unemployed. Alan Bleasedale’s dark comedy 
‘Boys from the Black Stuf’ with its anti-hero Yosser ‘Gissa Job’ Hughes betrayed 
an even starker reality that not even Merseyside’s famously self-deprecating sense of 
humour could hide. While Brixton may have beneited from the modest reforms to 
community policing introduced in the wake of the Scarman report (Scarman 1981), 
Liverpool continued to haemorrhage jobs. In July 1981, the area that came to be 
identiied by the national press as Toxteth—in reality the district of Granby within 
the locally more well-known postal district of Liverpool 8 (Frost and Phillips 2011, 
68)—along with 30 other towns and cities including Brixton in London, Hands-
worth in Birmingham and Chapeltown in Leeds, saw rioting that provoked a con-
certed investigation by the relatively new Conservative government to uncover the 
reasons for these disturbances.
In Liverpool 8, the unrest continued for nine consecutive nights at the end of 
which 70 buildings had been destroyed by ire, 500 people were arrested, 470 police 
oicers were injured, and a disabled man had been killed by a police vehicle (Frost 
and Philips 2011, p. xx). The unrest itself was attributed to high levels of unemploy-
ment (the highest in the country) and the aggravating and aggressive policing of the 
city’s black population. The report by Lord Justice Scarman into the Brixton riots 
(Scarman 1981) highlighted heavily racialised and antagonistic forms of policing 
that were later to be echoed by both the Macpherson report on the Stephen Lawrence 
murder in the early 1990s in London (Macpherson 1999) and by recent accounts of 
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signiicant levels of racism across the Metropolitan Police force.1 As with the Eng-
lish riots of August 2011, many media commentators and politicians identiied the 
sources of the disturbances as racial (angry black and Asian youths) and criminal 
(violent street gangs), essentially denying the enormous social pressures generated 
by living in a profoundly declining city-region and long histories of ethnic tension 
compounded by aggressive and disengaged policing styles.
The panic that surrounded the Brixton and Liverpool riots in 1981 was inlected 
by the traditional historic elisions of race, place and class—often collapsed into 
the term ‘underclass’—and the threat to law and order that the inner city in par-
ticular had begun to symbolise during the 1960s and 1970s (Hall et al. 1978). The 
independent inquiry into the Liverpool disorders led by Lord Giford described the 
extent of racial discrimination in Liverpool at the time as ‘uniquely horriic’. The 
inquiry report’s authors pointed to the uniqueness of the discrimination facing Black 
people in Liverpool in terms of the denial of access to jobs (even low paid ones), 
the exposure to threats, taunts, abuse and violence which obliged the population to 
self-conine within the Liverpool 8 district, and because the Liverpool City Council 
(unlike most other inner-city local authorities) failed to develop lasting policies to 
promote equal opportunities within its own workforce and the services it provided 
(Giford et al. 1989, pp. 82–83).
Despite a long history of black and Chinese settlement in what was regarded dur-
ing the nineteenth century as ‘the second city of empire’, Liverpool was far from 
the harmonious, cosmopolitan melting pot that oicial narratives often sought to 
portray. Indeed, racial discrimination had been a long-running feature of life for 
Merseyside’s black population. A Liverpool University survey undertaken 5 years 
before the Toxteth riots revealed that 31% of local employers admitted to acting 
in a discriminatory way to black applicants. An annual report of the North West 
Conciliation Committee of the Race Relations Board in the same year drew particu-
lar attention to Liverpool, noting the ‘patterns of discrimination and disadvantage 
against ethnic minorities’ which had ‘become institutionalised and hardened over 
a very long period of time’ (Giford et al. 1989, pp. 46–47). Indeed, the Black Linx 
newspaper argued that, far from being a harmonious multiracial society, Liverpool 
was ‘a city with a more subtle form of apartheid than Johannesburg’ (Belchem and 
Macraild 2006, p. 312).
The city as author of its own decline and necessary ejection
The emergence of the urban policy ield during the irst Thatcher government was 
structured according to two opposing poles. One, led by the then Secretary for the 
Environment, Michael Heseltine, supported the need for strategic central govern-
ment investment—a ‘concerted presence’ that presaged the creation of the Urban 
1 ‘Met chief admits institutional racism claims have “some justiication”’, The Guardian, 5 June 2015
 https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/uk-news/2015/jun/05/met-chief -admit s-insti tutio nal-racis m-claim s-have-
some-justi icat ion accessed 7 January 2017.
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Development Corporation as an emphatic and essentially neoliberal implement of 
anti-democratic planning (the Corporation had powers to compulsorily purchase and 
sell land and assets within geographical boundaries set by central government). The 
other position advanced by HM Treasury and the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Geofrey Howe, became associated with the unspoken and controversial policy of 
‘managed decline’, and the state’s abandonment of eforts to breathe new life into 
what many senior civil servants, ministers and their advisors regarded as a dying 
city that could not be rejuvenated via continued rounds of state subsidy.
As Michael Heseltine wrote in his emblematic report to Cabinet, It Took a Riot, 
far from strategic abandonment, what was required was a form of direct control or 
reincorporation of the city:
I opened this report by referring frankly to the inescapable connection between 
the riots and the visit [to Liverpool] I was asked to make. I cannot stress too 
strongly that my conclusions and proposals are not based on my fear of further 
riots. They are based on my beliefs that the conditions and prospects in the 
cities are not compatible with the traditions of social justice and national even-
handedness on which our Party prides itself … I have not expanded on the 
concept of a tactical retreat, a combination of economic erosion and encour-
aged evacuation.2
At the same time, Heseltine supported the view that the metropolitan counties 
(including the Greater London Council) should be disbanded (Hunt 2004). This 
curious mix of central co-ordination and dissolution can be explained as part of a 
broader strategy of de- and re-territorialisation at the level of the national politi-
cal ield aimed at reducing the political antagonisms generated by triennial election 
terms and an embedded left opposition, which continued to dominate the metropoli-
tan scale at that time (Lansley and Goss 1989). Heseltine’s interventionist stance 
antagonised his opponents in the Treasury on grounds of cost. For Hayekian purists 
like Sir Keith Joseph, who favoured what has now been revealed as a ‘“managed 
rundown” of Liverpool and its surrounding area’,3 any intervention in this context 
was seen as state planning (Hunt 2004). As Heseltine observed, when relecting on 
the establishment of the irst urban development corporations in London’s Dock-
lands and Liverpool:
My proposals still had a rough ride. For one thing, they ofended against our 
commitment to the slaughter of the quangos […] For another, the Treasury 
perceived a wide opening for additional public expenditure.4 The Prime Min-
2 National Archives PREM/19/578, Michael Heseltine, ‘It took a riot’, p. 6.
3 ‘Tories debated letting Liverpool “decline” 1981 archive: Thatcher ministers queried economic regen-
eration’, Financial Times, 30 December 2011.
4 See for example the minute on the Heseltine report drafted by G. J. Wasserman on behalf of the Prime 
Minister dated 1 September 1981 which stated, ‘I am, however, not convinced that channeling substan-
tial extra public money into these conurbations is either necessary or desirable at this stage’, National 
Archives PREM/19/578.
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ister, however, overruled objections, sharing my view that the dead hand of 
Socialism should be lifted (Heseltine 1987, 135–6).
What the lifting of ‘the dead hand of Socialism’ meant in practice was the removal 
of elected local authority jurisdiction and competence in designated high inter-
vention areas to a central government-appointed management board drawn almost 
exclusively from private business. Some 6000 acres of land on both sides of the 
Thames were to form the London Docklands Development Corporation and 900 
acres of ‘polluted wasteland in the heart of one of Britain’s great nineteenth-century 
cities’ was to form the Merseyside Docklands Corporation (Heseltine 1987, p. 136). 
The economic philosophy which underpinned this rescue of the largely abandoned 
and run-down post-industrial areas of the ‘inner cities’ was unashamedly Keynesian 
and interventionist. Writing on the newly created urban development corporations 
Heseltine explained:
They were to have the powers, with the inancial resources provided by cen-
tral government, to own and acquire land, build factories, and invest in both 
infrastructure and environment so as to attract industry and commercial and 
residential development. They were to exercise planning powers. In all practi-
cal senses they were to be New Town corporations in old cities. The wheel had 
turned full circle (Heseltine 1987, 136).
Michael Heseltine was under no illusion as to the scale of the problem that con-
fronted Liverpool, which ‘contained some of the worst housing in the country’ and 
‘60 per cent unemployment among the black youth of Toxteth’ (although this igure 
probably refers to Liverpool 8), the highest municipal rents in Britain and unions 
that ‘obstructed every change’ to the Port of Liverpool and the city’s two car plants, 
which ‘frightened potential investors’ (Heseltine 1987, pp. 136–137). In Cabinet 
meetings Heseltine regularly alluded to the second key policy position that has now 
been revealed to have been circulating at that time (the relevant Cabinet papers were 
released only in 2011 under the 30 year rule)—the suggestion by some senior oi-
cials that the city be left to rot, its polity neglected as a strategic move by central 
government to reduce iscal overheads and leave a population to sink or swim with-
out central state support. This came particularly from the Treasury; in a letter to the 
Prime Minister from Geofrey Howe on 11 August 1981, the Chancellor states:
For reasons we all understand, Liverpool is going to be much the hardest nut 
to crack … I cannot help feeling that the option of managed decline, which the 
CPRS [Central Policy Review Staf] rejected in its study of Merseyside, is one 
which we should not forget altogether. We must not expend all our resources in 
trying to make water low uphill.5
The Cabinet papers clearly show a more callous disposition in which a city whose 
political leaders had long been resistant to Whitehall impositions was to be cast as 
the author of its own demise via high wage costs, fractious union relations and a 
5 National Archives PREM/19/578.
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poor and disengaged population. In numerous documents, this view is ofered, 
largely promoted by the Treasury, in which a managed decline of the city should 
be instigated, allowing diminishing business conidence, historic out-migration and 
social decline to take its own path while denying calls for investment to staunch the 
marginal positioning of the city more broadly. This position is restated later with 
greater clarity, but there is also a recognition of the potential implications of what 
was being recommended:
[W]e need to get to grips with the problem. This has implications for urban 
policy. Should our aim be to stabilise the inner cities … or is this to pump 
water uphill? Should we rather go for ‘managed decline’? This is not a term 
for use, even privately’ (Letter, Geofrey Howe 4th Sept 1981).6
Heseltine’s letter to the Prime Minister indicates his plan for a senior presence in 
the form of a Cabinet member and department heads who would become responsi-
ble for trouble-shooting programme delivery in each of the major conurbations. A 
review of urban policy had begun in 1980, but it was Heseltine’s contention that a 
combination of bad industrial relations, the costs of running the port, poor housing, 
education, problematic race relations and policing all needed to be tackled in order 
to reintegrate the city into the needs of the emerging post-industrial economy. It was 
left to the Department of the Environment to take on the oversight of the seven ‘city 
partnerships’ bequeathed by the former Labour minister, Peter Shore, and Heseltine 
decided personally to take on the ‘tough nut’ of Liverpool and Merseyside (Hes-
eltine 1987, p. 136).
While Geofrey Howe was prepared to agree with his notoriously ‘wet’ Cabinet 
colleague, Jim Prior, that a signiicant contributing factor to the riots had been soar-
ing unemployment levels (2.85 million by July 1981), there was no willingness to 
support Michael Heseltine’s call for a pay freeze—or to abandon plans for further 
public spending cuts, a Treasury position that was strongly supported by the Prime 
Minister (Howe 1994, pp. 222–223). Howe does not mention in his biography the 
subsequent Cabinet discussion of Heseltine’s, or unsurprisingly the advocacy of a 
policy of managed decline, which the former Chancellor later denied was an accu-
rate account of his views from the Cabinet minutes.7 However, it was no secret that 
the Treasury had a strong aversion to investing in regional economies that were seen 
to be alicted by trade union radicalism, intransigent and wasteful local government 
and a low skilled and unproductive workforce. Also revealing is a statement from 
inside the government bundle of letters at this time that talks of a general sense of 
malaise in the city, the idea that putting in more investment would be frittered away 
and that the exit of industry could and should not be challenged. These views were 
also implicitly supported in a report from the Manchester Business School which 
argued that public infrastructure projects and massive investment would not be seen 
as a good use of resources (citing, among other problems, the new motorway that 
7 Sadie Gray, Howe defends urging Thatcher to abandon Liverpool to ‘managed decline’ http://www.
theti mes.co.uk/tto/news/polit ics/artic le327 2078.ece.
6 National Archives PREM/19/578.
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had been cut through Glasgow a few years previously) and that consultation with 
business and young people would be more efective.8
As a metropolitan authority, Merseyside had been at the centre of a struggle 
for control of a Labour Party which had been humiliatingly defeated by Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservatives in 1979 following the so-called ‘Winter of Discontent’ and 
the failure of Prime Minister James Callaghan to impose a wage freeze on public 
sector workers salaries as part of a long-running austerity programme that had been 
agreed with the International Monetary Fund in return for a substantial loan in 1976. 
Leading igures in the Militant Tendency—a Trotskyite organisation whose mem-
bers were encouraged to become active in their local Labour Party branches and 
where possible to take over oicial positions and to stand as candidates in local and 
parliamentary elections, such as Peter Taafe, Derek Hatton and Tony Mulhearn—
were committed to an all-out confrontation with the Conservative government, 
which eventually ended with the surcharging and expulsion from oice of 47 Labour 
councillors in Liverpool in 1987 (Frost and North 2013; Taafe and Mulhearn 1988).
As Jon Murden explains, the newly elected Thatcher government regarded Liv-
erpool as, ‘expensive, ineicient and badly run—incapable of responding ade-
quately, politically or administratively, to the scale of the problems it faced’ (Frost 
and Philips 2011, p. 111). The Treasury was equally troubled by the fact that three 
Labour run metropolitan authorities (the GLC, West Midlands and Merseyside) 
accounted for 6% of local government expenditure and 25% of all planned over-
spending. At a Chevening Conference in January 1981, the case for direct controls 
over local authority spending was forcefully made by Leon Brittan, the Chief Sec-
retary to the Treasury, but resisted by Heseltine and the Welsh Secretary, Nicholas 
Edwards.9 Heseltine certainly agreed with the view that the left-wing penetration of 
local authorities such as Liverpool and Lambeth had contributed to making matters 
much worse, while calling for ‘ways of giving Government support for job creation 
and wealth creation’ (Moore 2013, p. 635). But while some such as Heseltine cham-
pioned a strongly market-oriented and property-led approach to urban regeneration, 
this was far from a universal view. Despite initiatives such as the Urban Develop-
ment Corporations, which sought to remove key regeneration spaces from local 
political control, the refusal of Liverpool City Council to set a rate and to institute 
spending cuts—a strategy adopted by other inner-city local authorities such as Lam-
beth under Ted Knight (home to the Brixton riots of 1981)—helped to strengthen 
the anti-interventionist view of Thatcher’s more hawkish Cabinet colleagues that 
such insurgent spaces and communities should be required to face the economic 
consequences of their political choices, a Thatcherite doctrine that was to lead to the 
controversial and ultimately disastrous introduction of the poll tax, or community 
charge.
8 National Archives PREM/19/578.
9 National Archives, HM Treasury: Private Oice of the Chancellor of the Exchequer: Sir Geofrey 
Howe’s records T639/86.
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The ield of urban policy‑making: intervention versus divestment
The spatial patterning and daily trajectories of metropolitan policy-makers and Liv-
erpudlians reeling from the intensity and duration of the riots highlight a broader 
theme that warrants discussion in the context of our analysis of the urban disorders 
of the early 1980s. As social theorists have argued, social conditions and member-
ship of in-groups tend to structure the sense of social reality within groups (Berger 
and Luckmann 1966). Similarly, we may argue that the grounding of a sense of 
place within groups and in urban space has the efect of inluencing the nature of 
political responses and relative ignorance of conditions that generate a need for such 
responses—political constructions of place and problems are built from the policy-
maker’s own spatial and social structural positions and conditions. These are by 
their very nature socially and spatially disconnected from the reality of conditions 
faced by other groups. What is interesting in this particular narrative is the cross-
ing of these boundaries generated by Heseltine’s fact-inding mission to Liverpool. 
This appears to have punctured a metropolitan, Whitehall disposition and created a 
disjuncture between his immersion in the dispassionate, ideological and calculating 
responses of the Treasury and those feelings of shame at the plight of the city as he 
experienced it personally and directly:
The Mersey got to me. It was enormously signiicant in the history of our 
country, and I felt a debt to that river … It was an open sewer, and I felt deeply 
sad that we hadn’t realised what an enormous, valuable resource it was. That 
was where the idea came from, that we must make good the degradation of 
centurie (Michael Heseltine, Mersey Basin Campaign, 1987).10
Nevertheless, on his return to London the spatially distant and socially disengaged 
quality of policy-making again revealed itself, and the disconnection between the 
aluent lifestyle of an Oxfordshire estate-living publishing magnate and the sym-
bolic violence of rampant unemployment, social dislocation and diminished life 
prospects that was the daily reality for the millions of council estate dwellers on 
their modern ‘reserves’ is palpable. As Simon Jenkins is reported to have noted, the 
UDCs eerily resembled a colonial edict ‘imposing emergency rule on a defeated 
tribe’ (Hunt 2004). Yet Heseltine’s correspondence itself indicates that the release of 
details of the new arrangements for Liverpool’s regeneration should not be released 
until he had returned from holiday, stressing that ‘he does not want the statement 
to go out while he is lying on a beach in Mauritius. He thinks the reaction would 
be unfavourable’.11 This ‘London position’ reveals a view shaped both by economic 
logic but also a reading of Liverpool’s plight as one of pathological waywardness, 
self-directed political vandalism by a maia-like Marxist Left, and trade union 
proligacy.
However, thanks to the publication of conidential Cabinet minutes we are able to 
discern the clearly divergent and opposed policy ield positions of the Department of 
11 National Archives PREM/19/578, p. 12.
10 http://www.merse ybasi n.org.uk/colle ction s/it_took_a_riot.html.
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the Environment under Michael Heseltine and also the Department of Employment 
under Jim Prior with that of the Treasury team led by the Chancellor of the Excheq-
uer, Geofrey Howe. It is in Geofrey Howe’s response to the Prime Minister on Hes-
eltine’s It took a riot report that we learn of the alternative plans for a city that was 
considered to have gone of the rails and to be unworthy of further economic invest-
ment. The debates over what to do with Liverpool highlight the tension between a 
one-nation Conservatism espoused by Heseltine and a more combative laissez-faire 
mode of policy-making in which the riots ofered the possibility for legitimising a 
strategy of neglect. The Prime Minister, according to her oicial biographer, was 
somewhat torn between these competing ield positions—demanding both that ‘[t]he 
law must be upheld’ and that ‘[p]eople must be protected’ through the re-introduc-
tion of the Riot Act and summary courts where necessary, while also retrospectively 
pouring cold water on Lord Hailsham’s interventionist strategy for the north-east 
in the early 1960s. Thatcher warned her Cabinet colleagues at its meeting on 9 July 
that ‘We have poured money into big employments in Merseyside; a failure’ while 
blaming the social disafection of the inner cities on Labour authorities that had cre-
ated ‘horrible housing, high rise, etc.’ and the lifestyles of the non-working poor 
(‘We have a whole generation brought up on 5  h a day of TV’) (Moore 2013, p. 
637). As Margaret Thatcher wrote in her autobiography:
In the Commons and elsewhere I found myself countering the argument that 
the riots had been caused by unemployment. Behind their hands, some Con-
servatives echoed this criticism, complaining that the social fabric was being 
torn apart by the doctrinaire monetarism we had espoused. This rather over-
looked the fact that riots, football hooliganism and crime generally had been 
on the increase since the 1960s, most of that time under the very economic 
policies that our critics were urging us to adopt (Thatcher 1993, 144).
This provides an important insight into the thinking of the then Prime Minister, but 
if the causes of the riots were not unemployment and economic deprivation, as her 
critics among the Tory wets argued, could the blame be laid at the door of poor 
racial relations and, as Lord Scarman (Scarman 1981) was later to ind, in tensions 
between ethnic minority youth and the police? Margaret Thatcher seemed much 
more prepared to accept the possibility that events such as the riots in Brixton, Not-
tingham and Liverpool were in part a reaction to ‘police brutality and racial dis-
crimination’. Having visited Brixton police station and met with Sir David McNee 
the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police—who was promised every necessary 
resource to deal with the rioters, including baton rounds, water cannon, longer trun-
cheons and more riot vehicles—Margaret Thatcher travelled to Liverpool on 13 July 
1981. ‘Driving through Toxteth’, she wrote:
I observed that for all that was said about deprivation, the housing there was 
by no means the worst in the city. I had been told that some of the young peo-
ple involved got into trouble through boredom and not having enough to do. 
But you had only to look at the grounds around those houses with the grass 
untended, some of it almost waist high, and the litter, to see that this was a 
false analysis. They had plenty of constructive things to do if they wanted. 
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Instead, I asked myself how people could live in such circumstances without 
trying to clear up the mess and improve their surroundings. What was clearly 
lacking was a sense of pride and personal responsibility — something which 
the state can easily remove but almost never give back (Thatcher 1993, 145).
Thatcher’s reception in Liverpool could hardly have been described as warm, how-
ever. Her press secretary, Bernard Ingham, observed that she was ‘pelted with 
tomatoes and toilet rolls’. The press were hardly more supportive, most newspapers 
describing the tumult of the inner-city riots in Ingham’s words as ‘your 10 most 
worrying days since you took oice’ (Moore 2013, p. 636). In her account of the 
response to the riots, Mrs Thatcher dismissed the interventionist arguments of Lord 
Scarman and Michael Heseltine—whatever the latter ‘might achieve by skilful pub-
lic relations’—in order to concentrate on the more urgent task of upholding the 
rule of law, ‘to maintain order’ and to ‘uphold the Queen’s peace’.12 Mrs Thatcher 
insisted that young people did not need social workers to speak on their behalf, but 
they did need to listen to the Prime Minister reminding them ‘that resources had 
been poured into Liverpool’, that she was concerned about what they had to say 
about the police and ‘that while the colour of a person’s skin did not matter to me 
at all, crime did. I urged them not to resort to violence or to try to live in separate 
communities from the rest of us’ (Thatcher 1993, p. 146). Here the Prime Minister’s 
position appears strongly aligned with notions of individual pathology and the idea 
that the roots of criminality lay in a lack of personal responsibility. Eschewing a 
sociological or structural reading of the sources of discontent, discrimination and a 
setting of profound urban decline, her view inclined towards the Treasury view that 
Merseyside’s economy could not ever have been rescued through a further ‘pouring-
in’ of ever more resources to no purpose.
Through more sustained contact with Liverpool’s conditions, Heseltine’s views 
appeared to ofer a greater awareness, either of some threat to sovereign power, or 
to recognise more seriously the plight represented by urban poverty in the nation’s 
‘elsewheres’. Heseltine now insisted that austerity plans for £5 billion in spending 
cuts and tax reductions ‘has nothing to do with [the] problem of Merseyside. Col-
leagues don’t understand how bad it is … We have a society which is close to much 
more violence’ (Moore 2013, p. 637). The privileging of the City of London as the 
Treasury’s chief interlocutor in the national economy was identiied by Heseltine 
as a major weakness in UK economic policy. Industry was constantly pointed in 
the direction of the far less powerful Department of Trade and Industry, which pos-
sessed no macroeconomic levers and a limited budget for direct inward investment 
(Heseltine 1987, p. 124). Although Heseltine succeeded in persuading leading ig-
ures in UK business and inance to visit the riot torn streets of Liverpool and to 
see the results of the violence at irst hand, there was little to show in terms of new 
12 Margaret Thatcher, speech to the Conservative Party Conference, Blackpool, 16 October 1981, in 
Harris, 1997: 144.
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private investment in the most deprived of Liverpool’s wards which still continue to 
rank among the poorest in the country.13
In the face of growing unemployment and declining political support at home, 
with the newly created SDP nearly winning the Warrington by-election and poll-
ing 45% compared to 29% for Labour and a dismal 25% for the Conservatives, only 
Keith Joseph openly backed the Treasury’s delationary strategy. As a newly elected 
Prime Minister surrounded by Cabinet colleagues such as Willie Whitelaw and Jim 
Prior who mostly still espoused ‘one nation’ narratives of Conservatism, Thatcher 
reluctantly agreed to Heseltine’s request to appoint him ‘Minister for the Mersey’ 
and to make inner-city regeneration a political priority for her government. Never-
theless, Michael Heseltine’s strategy of a depoliticised and deterritorialised urban 
political economy, as manifested through the Urban Development Corporation and 
City Challenge Partnerships (Imrie and Thomas 1999, p. 5), opened-up new specu-
lative opportunities for capital among the post-industrial urban landscape. The new 
opportunities represented by forms of investment and marketisation of such land-
scapes can be captured in Margaret Thatcher’s visit to Middlesbrough’s abandoned 
Head Wrightson steel plant in September 1987. It was here that she promised to 
tackle the problems of Britain’s inner cities, relying heavily on Heseltine’s interven-
tionist economic legacy (Buchanan et al. 2009).
Conclusion
How can we understand the interplay in the relationship between unequal urban 
conditions and policy frameworks devised to ameliorate them? In this article, we 
have sought to develop a perspective that takes in a recent historical analysis in 
which the role of policy-making and key actors in the metropolitan core are related 
to urban conditions and social marginality elsewhere. In urban policy studies, there 
has been a persistent tendency to see urban public space as being increasingly reg-
ulated, either through inclusive or overwhelming forms of policy and policing, or 
via social scripts associated with privatisation and consumption. However, another 
mode of control can be found in the imposition of central state designated urban 
policy interventions. In this article, we have argued that the unrest in English cities 
of the early 1980s acted as a catalyst for a concerted response by central govern-
ment. This response was itself bifurcated into contestatory positions in an emerging 
ield of urban policy conigured around notions of managing social abjection, on the 
one hand, and progressive interventions that also opened the way for more assertive 
forms of control by denuding local government of many of its autonomous policy 
functions. This ideological divergence between a neoliberal oriented public–private 
interventionism and a more utilitarian policy of strategic abandonment and divest-
ment came to deine much of the British urban policy ield in the ensuing decades.
13 The English Indices of Deprivation 2010, DCLG https ://www.gov.uk/gover nment /uploa ds/syste m/
uploa ds/attac hment _data/ile/6871/18712 08.pdf.
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Merseyside in general, and Liverpool in particular, have frequently been con-
fronted by forms of collective symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1991, p. 24) wielded by 
a London political establishment. In combination with a goading tabloid media, the 
city has frequently been accused of dwelling on a kind of self-fulilling nihilism that 
would always undermine interventionist or supportive economic strategies capable 
of reconnecting it to the broader healthy body of the United Kingdom. These ideas 
have continued to retain a strong hold on policy imaginaries more broadly. As the 
former Mayor of London and now Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, wrote in Octo-
ber 2004 in relation to the 1989 Hillsborough tragedy:
Liverpool is a handsome city with a tribal sense of community. A combination 
of economic misfortune — its docks were, fundamentally, on the wrong side 
of England when Britain entered what is now the European Union — and an 
excessive predilection for welfarism have created a peculiar, and deeply unat-
tractive, psyche among many Liverpudlians. They see themselves whenever 
possible as victims, and resent their victim status; yet at the same time they 
wallow in it. Part of this lawed psychological state is that they cannot accept 
that they might have made any contribution to their misfortunes, but seek 
rather to blame someone else for it, thereby deepening their sense of shared 
tribal grievance against the rest of society.14
Imogen Tyler reminds us that notions of abjection describe ‘the dehumanization 
of labour, class struggle, mass fanaticism’ that have allowed despised sections of 
the population to be excluded as moral outcasts, ‘represented from the outside with 
disgust as the dregs of the people, populace and gutter’ (Tyler 2013, p. 19). As an 
immigrant city whose maritime economy depended to a large degree on itinerant 
and casualised labour, Liverpool has long had to endure the social stigma attached 
to sites of endemic long-term unemployment and urban poverty.
In resisting the stigmatisation of a city that prides itself on its cultural heritage, 
community spirit and indefatigability, Liverpool continues to challenge a neoliberal 
policy orthodoxy that has largely deterritorialised and disempowered city govern-
ments in the rest of England and Wales (Featherstone 2015). We have argued here 
that the state can be seen to have attempted a complex patterning of both managed 
decline and forced incorporation that was steered through the creation of local agen-
cies and geographies of governance (the ledgling Urban Programme), policing 
(with the advent of elected Police and Crime Commissioners), and the decentralisa-
tion of austerity management and welfare retrenchment through the establishment of 
executive city mayors.
The violent urban disturbances in Liverpool and other inner-city communities 
in the early 1980s initiated a long-running debate within successive Conservative 
governments. In this article, we have sought to show that, far from being a momen-
tary lapse of Treasury ‘group think’, the notion of ‘managed decline’ remains a 
salient policy tool that continues to attract inluential support from academics and 
14 Boris Johnson, ‘Bigley’s fate. We have lost our sense of proportion about what constitutes a tragedy’, 
The Spectator, 16 October 2004.
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policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic in a context of diminishing support for 
welfare pluralism and the elite championing of entrepreneurial spatial competition 
(Glaeser 1998; Leunig and Swaield 2007; Florida 2010; Davidson et al. 2013). On 
the political left, alternative narratives of strategic engagement with the ‘inner city’ 
and the post-industrial cities of the north have come to emphasise the language of 
partnership and enterprise as the twin pillars of a new social compact built around a 
fundamental belief that in terms of the potential for capital accumulation ‘no space 
should be left behind’. With the apparent demise of the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ as a 
hegemonic model for re-integrating the cities of Northern England into an increas-
ingly London-centred national economy, it is far from clear, however, that the stra-
tegic abandonment of ‘uneconomic’ regional spaces is inally of the policy agenda 
(Gibbons et al. 2014).
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